GREAT SOUTHERN MARITIME SERVICES CORP. vs. SURIGAO

GREAT SOUTHERN MARITIME SERVICES CORP. vs. SURIGAO

G.R. No. 183646 – September 18, 2009

FACTS:

Respondent Leonila Surigao’s husband, the late Salvador M. Surigao, was hired as Fitter by petitioner Great Southern Maritime Corporation, for and in behalf of co-petitioner IMC Shipping Co. Pte., Ltd. (Singapore) for a period of ten (10) months. In his pre-employment medical examination (PEME), he was found fit for sea duty. Thus, on April 29, 2001, he commenced his work aboard M/V Selendang Nilam.

However, on August 22, 2001, as per Ship Master’s advice, a doctor was sent on board the vessel to medically attend to Salvador due to complaints of extensive neuro dermatitis, neck region viral, aetiology, urticaria, macula popular, rash extending to the face, chest and abdomen. After examination, Salvador was advised to take a blood test. His condition having worsened, he was confined at the Seven Hills Hospital. Not long thereafter, the Ship Master decided to sign him off from the vessel on August 25, 2001 for treatment in the hospital and for repatriation upon certification of the doctor that he was fit to travel. Prior to his repatriation, though, or on August 26, 2001, Salvador was found dead inside the bathroom of his hospital room. Later, the body was transferred to a government hospital, the Ling George Hospital Mortuary Hall, for post-mortem examination. The Post-Mortem Certificate issued by the Department of Forensic Medicine, Visakhapatnam City, stated that the cause of death of Salvador was asphyxia due to hanging.

As an heir of the deceased seaman, petitioner, for and in behalf of her minor children, filed for death compensation benefits under the terms of the standard employment contract, but her claims were denied by the petitioners. On October 28, 2003, the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision ordering petitioners to pay the amount of $71,500 or its equivalent in Philippine pesos at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of actual payment representing the death benefits, burial expenses of the deceased Salvador and attorney’s fees.

On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter and declared petitioners not liable for death benefits. In lieu thereof, however, the commission directed the petitioners to grant financial assistance to the respondent in the amount of $5,000. Respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision, but the commission in a Resolution dated May 24, 2007, denied the same.

Respondent thereafter elevated the case to the appellate court which reversed the decision of the NLRC and reinstated that of the Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals found that Salvador did not commit suicide; hence, respondents are entitled to receive death benefits. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated July 8, 2008. Hence, the present petition was filed before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners are liable to pay the death benefits being claimed.

RULING:

No.

The general rule is that the employer is liable to pay the heirs of the deceased seafarer for death benefits once it is established that he died during the effectivity of his employment contract. However, the employer may be exempted from liability if he can successfully prove that the seafarer’s death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or wilful act. In sum, respondents’ entitlement to any death benefits depends on whether the evidence if the petitioners suffices to prove that the deceased committed suicide; the burden of proof rests on his employer.

The post-mortem examination conclusively established that the true cause of death was asphyxia or suffocation. The appellate court’s ruling that while it may be consistent with the theory that the deceased hanged himself but it does not rule out the possibility that he might have died of other causes, does not persuade. Aside from being purely speculative, the Court finds it hard to believe that someone strangled Salvador inside the bathroom then locked the door thereof on his way out undetected. As shown by the evidence presented by the petitioners, the bathroom door was locked or bolted from the inside and could not be opened from outside. In order to gain entrance, the hospital staff had to pass through a closed door with a mess leading to the ceiling of the bathroom. Entry could not likewise be effected through the bathroom window as it has grills.

Moreover, the conclusion that Salvador could not have hanged himself to the showerhead as he was found lying on the floor with a belt tied around his neck; or that he could not have died since the pipe broke down and he fell therefrom, are based on speculations and hypothetical in nature. This confusion could have been avoided had the Court of Appeals and the Labor Arbiter considered the most logical possibility that Salvador died hanging on the showerhead before the pipe broke down due to his body weight, and thus, explaining why he was found on the floor with the belt still on his neck and broken pipe and showerhead near his lifeless body. That the post-mortem examination, the Certification of Dr. Raju and the police inquest report, all stated that Salvador’s cause of death was asphyxia due to hanging, and not due to any the injury, lead to a fair and just conclusion that Salvador was already dead before the showerhead broke.