That one money/energy/sanity-draining semester..

Second Year – First Semester

Alright, another semester is over. Akalain mo yun, naka-tatlong sem na ako sa law school. Kuddos!

So far, this sem is the most money/energy/sanity-draining sem I had in law school. I experienced so many things, as in!

Naranasan ko umabsent sa isang subject para lang makapag-aral sa isa pang subject. Frustrating pag wala palang klase o recit, sayang yung pag-absent mo dun sa isa. Naranasan ko matulog ng 4am, at gumising ng 8am para lang makapagreview. Naranasan ko matawag sa recitation for three consecutive meetings. Yung parang twenty minutes na lang at uwian na, natawag ka pa. Naranasan ko tumayo for almost two hours dahil sa recitation. Hindi pwedeng umupo hangga't hindi satisfied si Atty. sa mga sagot mo. Buhay nga naman. Hahaha. Pero naranasan ko rin na hindi matawag sa recit for a month, na nagagalit na yung mga kaklase ko dahil hindi ako natatawag. But I guess I paid the price for that when I failed the subject. Traggic.

First time, ever, ko makakuha ng FAILED (F) na final grade. Something I should be sad about, but it’s good that I already accepted the failure even before I saw it. Friday pa lang, pagkabigay ng test questionnaire, tinanggap ko na. Hahaha. When I opened my SIS account, natulala lang ako sandali tapos okay na, hindi na ako naiyak or nagulat. Parang mas magugulat pa ako kung Passed (P) ang nakita ko. Salamat pa rin sa experience, Atty. Salao. Dahil po sa inyo, kasama na ako sa "General Rule." Hehehe. Administrative Law, I’ll see you again next sem. Magtutuos tayo. Aja!

At sa only major subject ko, Property, sobrang thankful ko po nung nakita ko yung grade ko. Sabi ko nga, tinapay lang po yung hiningi ko, pero yung binigay ni Bro, may palaman pa at may kasama pang soft drinks. The best! Salamat, Fiscal Luna.

Pero yung grade na nagpaiyak sa’kin – TRES (3.0). Galing kay Atty. Mercado, professor ko sa Special Contracts. Sobrang thankful ko po dyan, promise! First time ko rin makakuha ng tres pero alam mo yun, priceless. Tagalang sa mga ganitong pagkakataon, mamahalin mo talaga sya. Thank you so much, Sir! Salamat po ulit sa J.Co. Hehehe.

After seeing these grades, I can finally say na law student na nga talaga ako. Hahaha. Hindi pwedeng petiks, hindi pwedeng pwede na, dapat first day pa lang ng klase, magpondo ka na para hindi mahirapan humabol. I learned it the hard way, but still, the most important thing is to keep on moving forward. Just continue, move on, and never give up. Aja!

Salamat, Bro! I owe You everything.

“Lord, give me the strength to accept the things that I cannot change; the courage to change the things that I can; and the wisdom to know the difference.”

x, Aia Tibayan Metrillo

GREAT SOUTHERN MARITIME SERVICES CORP. vs. SURIGAO

GREAT SOUTHERN MARITIME SERVICES CORP. vs. SURIGAO

G.R. No. 183646 – September 18, 2009

FACTS:

Respondent Leonila Surigao’s husband, the late Salvador M. Surigao, was hired as Fitter by petitioner Great Southern Maritime Corporation, for and in behalf of co-petitioner IMC Shipping Co. Pte., Ltd. (Singapore) for a period of ten (10) months. In his pre-employment medical examination (PEME), he was found fit for sea duty. Thus, on April 29, 2001, he commenced his work aboard M/V Selendang Nilam.

However, on August 22, 2001, as per Ship Master’s advice, a doctor was sent on board the vessel to medically attend to Salvador due to complaints of extensive neuro dermatitis, neck region viral, aetiology, urticaria, macula popular, rash extending to the face, chest and abdomen. After examination, Salvador was advised to take a blood test. His condition having worsened, he was confined at the Seven Hills Hospital. Not long thereafter, the Ship Master decided to sign him off from the vessel on August 25, 2001 for treatment in the hospital and for repatriation upon certification of the doctor that he was fit to travel. Prior to his repatriation, though, or on August 26, 2001, Salvador was found dead inside the bathroom of his hospital room. Later, the body was transferred to a government hospital, the Ling George Hospital Mortuary Hall, for post-mortem examination. The Post-Mortem Certificate issued by the Department of Forensic Medicine, Visakhapatnam City, stated that the cause of death of Salvador was asphyxia due to hanging.

As an heir of the deceased seaman, petitioner, for and in behalf of her minor children, filed for death compensation benefits under the terms of the standard employment contract, but her claims were denied by the petitioners. On October 28, 2003, the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision ordering petitioners to pay the amount of $71,500 or its equivalent in Philippine pesos at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of actual payment representing the death benefits, burial expenses of the deceased Salvador and attorney’s fees.

On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter and declared petitioners not liable for death benefits. In lieu thereof, however, the commission directed the petitioners to grant financial assistance to the respondent in the amount of $5,000. Respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision, but the commission in a Resolution dated May 24, 2007, denied the same.

Respondent thereafter elevated the case to the appellate court which reversed the decision of the NLRC and reinstated that of the Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals found that Salvador did not commit suicide; hence, respondents are entitled to receive death benefits. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated July 8, 2008. Hence, the present petition was filed before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners are liable to pay the death benefits being claimed.

RULING:

No.

The general rule is that the employer is liable to pay the heirs of the deceased seafarer for death benefits once it is established that he died during the effectivity of his employment contract. However, the employer may be exempted from liability if he can successfully prove that the seafarer’s death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or wilful act. In sum, respondents’ entitlement to any death benefits depends on whether the evidence if the petitioners suffices to prove that the deceased committed suicide; the burden of proof rests on his employer.

The post-mortem examination conclusively established that the true cause of death was asphyxia or suffocation. The appellate court’s ruling that while it may be consistent with the theory that the deceased hanged himself but it does not rule out the possibility that he might have died of other causes, does not persuade. Aside from being purely speculative, the Court finds it hard to believe that someone strangled Salvador inside the bathroom then locked the door thereof on his way out undetected. As shown by the evidence presented by the petitioners, the bathroom door was locked or bolted from the inside and could not be opened from outside. In order to gain entrance, the hospital staff had to pass through a closed door with a mess leading to the ceiling of the bathroom. Entry could not likewise be effected through the bathroom window as it has grills.

Moreover, the conclusion that Salvador could not have hanged himself to the showerhead as he was found lying on the floor with a belt tied around his neck; or that he could not have died since the pipe broke down and he fell therefrom, are based on speculations and hypothetical in nature. This confusion could have been avoided had the Court of Appeals and the Labor Arbiter considered the most logical possibility that Salvador died hanging on the showerhead before the pipe broke down due to his body weight, and thus, explaining why he was found on the floor with the belt still on his neck and broken pipe and showerhead near his lifeless body. That the post-mortem examination, the Certification of Dr. Raju and the police inquest report, all stated that Salvador’s cause of death was asphyxia due to hanging, and not due to any the injury, lead to a fair and just conclusion that Salvador was already dead before the showerhead broke.

LEONIS NAVIGATION CO., INC. vs. VILLAMATER

LEONIS NAVIGATION CO., INC. vs. VILLAMATER

G.R. No. 179169 – March 3, 2010

FACTS:

Private respondent Catalino U. Villamater was hired as Chief Engineer for the ship M/V Nord Monaco, owned by petitioner World Marine Panama, S.A., through the services of petitioner Leonis Navigation Co., Inc., as the latter’s local manning agent. Consequent to this employment, Villamater, on June 4, 2002, executed an employment contract, incorporating the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels as prescribed by the POEA. Prior to his deployment, Villamater underwent the required Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME). He passed the PEME and was declared “Fit to Work.” Thereafter, Villamater was deployed on June 26, 2002.

Sometime in October 2002, Villamater suffered intestinal bleeding and was given a blood transfusion. Thereafter, he again felt weak, lost considerable weight, and suffered intermittent intestinal pain. He consulted a physician in Hamburg, Germany, who advised hospital confinement. Villamater was diagnosed with Obstructive Adenocarcinoma of the Sigmoid, with multiple liver matastases, possibly local peritoneal carcinosis and infiltration of the bladder, possibly lung metastasis, and anemia; Candida Esophagitis; and Chronic Gastritis. He was advised to undergo chemotherapy and continuous supportive treatment, such as pain-killers and blood transfusion. Villamater was later repatriated, under medical escort, as soon as he was deemed fit to travel. As soon as he arrived in the Philippines, Villamater was referred to company-designated physicians. The diagnosis and the recommended treatment abroad were confirmed. He was advised to undergo six (6) cycles of chemotherapy. However, Dr. Kelly Siy Salvador, one of the company-designated physicians, opined that Villamater’s condition “appears to be not work-related,” but suggested disability grading of 1.

In the course of his chemotherapy, when no noticeable improvement occurred, Villamater filed a complaint before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC for payment of permanent and total disability benefits in the amount of $80,000, reimbursement of medical and hospitalization expenses in the amount of P11,393.65, moral damages in the sum of P1,000,000, exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000, as well as attorney’s fees. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dated July 28, 2003 in favor of Villamater, holding that his illness was compensable, but denying his claim for moral and exemplary damages.

Petitioners appealed to the NLRC. Villamater also filed his own appeal, questioning the award of the Labor Arbiter and claiming that the 100% degree of disability should be compensated in the amount of $80,000. On February 4, 2004, the NLRC issued its resolution dismissing the respective appeals of both parties and affirming in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of the February 4, 2004 resolution, but the NLRC denied the same. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals. On May 3, 2007, the appellate court rendered its assailed decision dismissing the petition. The appellate court, likewise, denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition was filed before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Villamater is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.

RULING:

Yes.

In the case of Villamater, it is manifest that the interplay of age, hereditary, and dietary factors contributed to the development of colon cancer. By the time he signed his employment contract on June 4, 2002, he was already 58 years old, an age at which the incidence of colon cancer is more likely. He had a familial history of colon cancer. Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found his illness compensable for permanent and total disability, because they found that his dietary provisions while at sea increased the risk of contracting colon cancer because he had no choice of what to eat on board except those provided on the vessels and these consisted mainly of high-fat, high-cholesterol, and low-fiber foods.

While findings of the Labor Arbiter, which were affirmed by the NLRC, are entitled to great weight and are binding upon the courts, nonetheless, the Court finds it also worthy to note that even during the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, Villamater cited that the foods provided on board the vessels were mostly meat, high in fat and high in cholesterol. On this matter, noticeably, petitioners were silent when they argued that Villamater’s affliction was brought about by diet and genetics. It was only after the Labor Arbiter issued his Decision, finding colon cancer to be compensable because the risk was increased by the victuals provided on board, that petitioners started claiming that the foods available on the vessels also consisted of fresh fruits and vegetables, not to mention fish and poultry. It is also worth mentioning that while Dr. Salvador declared Villamater’s cancer “appears to be not work-related,” she nevertheless suggested to petitioners Disability Grade 1, which, under the POEA Standard Contract, “shall be considered or shall constitute total and permanent disability.” During his confinement in Hamburg, Germany, Villamater was diagnosed to have colon cancer and was advised to undergo chemotherapy and medical treatment, including blood transfusions. These findings were, in fact, confirmed by the findings of the company-designated physicians. The statement of Dr. Salvador that Villamater’s colon cancer “appears to be not work-related” remained at that, without any medical explanation to support the same. However, this statement, not definitive as it is, was negated by the same doctor’s suggestion of Disability Grade 1. Under Section 20-B of the POEA Standard Employment Contract, it is the company-designated physician who must certify that the seafarer has suffered permanent disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of his employment.