Tuesday, October 22, 2013

That one money/energy/sanity-draining semester..

Second Year – First Semester

Alright, another semester is over. Akalain mo yun, naka-tatlong sem na ako sa law school. Kuddos!
So far, this sem is the most money/energy/sanity-draining sem I had in law school. I experienced so many things, as in!

Naranasan ko umabsent sa isang subject para lang makapag-aral sa isa pang subject. Frustrating pag wala palang klase o recit, sayang yung pag-absent mo dun sa isa. Naranasan ko matulog ng 4am, at gumising ng 8am para lang makapagreview. Naranasan ko matawag sa recitation for three consecutive meetings. Yung parang twenty minutes na lang at uwian na, natawag ka pa. Naranasan ko tumayo for almost two hours dahil sa recitation. Hindi pwedeng umupo hangga't hindi satisfied si Atty. sa mga sagot mo. Buhay nga naman. Hahaha. Pero naranasan ko rin na hindi matawag sa recit for a month, na nagagalit na yung mga kaklase ko dahil hindi ako natatawag. But I guess I paid the price for that when I failed the subject. Traggic.

First time, ever, ko makakuha ng FAILED (F) na final grade. Something I should be sad about, but it’s good that I already accepted the failure even before I saw it. Friday pa lang, pagkabigay ng test questionnaire, tinanggap ko na. Hahaha. When I opened my SIS account, natulala lang ako sandali tapos okay na, hindi na ako naiyak or nagulat. Parang mas magugulat pa ako kung Passed (P) ang nakita ko. Salamat pa rin sa experience, Atty. Salao. Dahil po sa inyo, kasama na ako sa "General Rule." Hehehe. Administrative Law, I’ll see you again next sem. Magtutuos tayo. Aja!

At sa only major subject ko, Property, sobrang thankful ko po nung nakita ko yung grade ko. Sabi ko nga, tinapay lang po yung hiningi ko, pero yung binigay ni Bro, may palaman pa at may kasama pang soft drinks. The best! Salamat, Fiscal Luna.

Pero yung grade na nagpaiyak sa’kin – TRES (3.0). Galing kay Atty. Mercado, professor ko sa Special Contracts. Sobrang thankful ko po dyan, promise! First time ko rin makakuha ng tres pero alam mo yun, priceless. Tagalang sa mga ganitong pagkakataon, mamahalin mo talaga sya. Thank you so much, Sir! Salamat po ulit sa J.Co. Hehehe.

After seeing these grades, I can finally say na law student na nga talaga ako. Hahaha. Hindi pwedeng petiks, hindi pwedeng pwede na, dapat first day pa lang ng klase, magpondo ka na para hindi mahirapan humabol. I learned it the hard way, but still, the most important thing is to keep on moving forward. Just continue, move on, and never give up. Aja!

Salamat, Bro! I owe You everything.


“Lord, give me the strength to accept the things that I cannot change; the courage to change the things that I can; and the wisdom to know the difference.”



x, Aia Tibayan Metrillo


Monday, October 7, 2013

GREAT SOUTHERN MARITIME SERVICES CORP. vs. SURIGAO

GREAT SOUTHERN MARITIME SERVICES CORP. vs. SURIGAO
G.R. No. 183646 – September 18, 2009

FACTS:
Respondent Leonila Surigao’s husband, the late Salvador M. Surigao, was hired as Fitter by petitioner Great Southern Maritime Corporation, for and in behalf of co-petitioner IMC Shipping Co. Pte., Ltd. (Singapore) for a period of ten (10) months. In his pre-employment medical examination (PEME), he was found fit for sea duty. Thus, on April 29, 2001, he commenced his work aboard M/V Selendang Nilam.

However, on August 22, 2001, as per Ship Master’s advice, a doctor was sent on board the vessel to medically attend to Salvador due to complaints of extensive neuro dermatitis, neck region viral, aetiology, urticaria, macula popular, rash extending to the face, chest and abdomen. After examination, Salvador was advised to take a blood test. His condition having worsened, he was confined at the Seven Hills Hospital. Not long thereafter, the Ship Master decided to sign him off from the vessel on August 25, 2001 for treatment in the hospital and for repatriation upon certification of the doctor that he was fit to travel. Prior to his repatriation, though, or on August 26, 2001, Salvador was found dead inside the bathroom of his hospital room. Later, the body was transferred to a government hospital, the Ling George Hospital Mortuary Hall, for post-mortem examination. The Post-Mortem Certificate issued by the Department of Forensic Medicine, Visakhapatnam City, stated that the cause of death of Salvador was asphyxia due to hanging.

As an heir of the deceased seaman, petitioner, for and in behalf of her minor children, filed for death compensation benefits under the terms of the standard employment contract, but her claims were denied by the petitioners. On October 28, 2003, the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision ordering petitioners to pay the amount of $71,500 or its equivalent in Philippine pesos at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of actual payment representing the death benefits, burial expenses of the deceased Salvador and attorney’s fees.

On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter and declared petitioners not liable for death benefits. In lieu thereof, however, the commission directed the petitioners to grant financial assistance to the respondent in the amount of $5,000. Respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision, but the commission in a Resolution dated May 24, 2007, denied the same.

Respondent thereafter elevated the case to the appellate court which reversed the decision of the NLRC and reinstated that of the Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals found that Salvador did not commit suicide; hence, respondents are entitled to receive death benefits. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated July 8, 2008. Hence, the present petition was filed before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are liable to pay the death benefits being claimed.

RULING:
No.

The general rule is that the employer is liable to pay the heirs of the deceased seafarer for death benefits once it is established that he died during the effectivity of his employment contract. However, the employer may be exempted from liability if he can successfully prove that the seafarer’s death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or wilful act. In sum, respondents’ entitlement to any death benefits depends on whether the evidence if the petitioners suffices to prove that the deceased committed suicide; the burden of proof rests on his employer.

The post-mortem examination conclusively established that the true cause of death was asphyxia or suffocation. The appellate court’s ruling that while it may be consistent with the theory that the deceased hanged himself but it does not rule out the possibility that he might have died of other causes, does not persuade. Aside from being purely speculative, the Court finds it hard to believe that someone strangled Salvador inside the bathroom then locked the door thereof on his way out undetected. As shown by the evidence presented by the petitioners, the bathroom door was locked or bolted from the inside and could not be opened from outside. In order to gain entrance, the hospital staff had to pass through a closed door with a mess leading to the ceiling of the bathroom. Entry could not likewise be effected through the bathroom window as it has grills.

Moreover, the conclusion that Salvador could not have hanged himself to the showerhead as he was found lying on the floor with a belt tied around his neck; or that he could not have died since the pipe broke down and he fell therefrom, are based on speculations and hypothetical in nature. This confusion could have been avoided had the Court of Appeals and the Labor Arbiter considered the most logical possibility that Salvador died hanging on the showerhead before the pipe broke down due to his body weight, and thus, explaining why he was found on the floor with the belt still on his neck and broken pipe and showerhead near his lifeless body. That the post-mortem examination, the Certification of Dr. Raju and the police inquest report, all stated that Salvador’s cause of death was asphyxia due to hanging, and not due to any the injury, lead to a fair and just conclusion that Salvador was already dead before the showerhead broke.

LEONIS NAVIGATION CO., INC. vs. VILLAMATER

LEONIS NAVIGATION CO., INC. vs. VILLAMATER
G.R. No. 179169 – March 3, 2010

FACTS:
Private respondent Catalino U. Villamater was hired as Chief Engineer for the ship M/V Nord Monaco, owned by petitioner World Marine Panama, S.A., through the services of petitioner Leonis Navigation Co., Inc., as the latter’s local manning agent. Consequent to this employment, Villamater, on June 4, 2002, executed an employment contract, incorporating the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels as prescribed by the POEA. Prior to his deployment, Villamater underwent the required Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME). He passed the PEME and was declared “Fit to Work.” Thereafter, Villamater was deployed on June 26, 2002.

Sometime in October 2002, Villamater suffered intestinal bleeding and was given a blood transfusion. Thereafter, he again felt weak, lost considerable weight, and suffered intermittent intestinal pain. He consulted a physician in Hamburg, Germany, who advised hospital confinement. Villamater was diagnosed with Obstructive Adenocarcinoma of the Sigmoid, with multiple liver matastases, possibly local peritoneal carcinosis and infiltration of the bladder, possibly lung metastasis, and anemia; Candida Esophagitis; and Chronic Gastritis. He was advised to undergo chemotherapy and continuous supportive treatment, such as pain-killers and blood transfusion. Villamater was later repatriated, under medical escort, as soon as he was deemed fit to travel. As soon as he arrived in the Philippines, Villamater was referred to company-designated physicians. The diagnosis and the recommended treatment abroad were confirmed. He was advised to undergo six (6) cycles of chemotherapy. However, Dr. Kelly Siy Salvador, one of the company-designated physicians, opined that Villamater’s condition “appears to be not work-related,” but suggested disability grading of 1.

In the course of his chemotherapy, when no noticeable improvement occurred, Villamater filed a complaint before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC for payment of permanent and total disability benefits in the amount of $80,000, reimbursement of medical and hospitalization expenses in the amount of P11,393.65, moral damages in the sum of P1,000,000, exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000, as well as attorney’s fees. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dated July 28, 2003 in favor of Villamater, holding that his illness was compensable, but denying his claim for moral and exemplary damages.

Petitioners appealed to the NLRC. Villamater also filed his own appeal, questioning the award of the Labor Arbiter and claiming that the 100% degree of disability should be compensated in the amount of $80,000. On February 4, 2004, the NLRC issued its resolution dismissing the respective appeals of both parties and affirming in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of the February 4, 2004 resolution, but the NLRC denied the same. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals. On May 3, 2007, the appellate court rendered its assailed decision dismissing the petition. The appellate court, likewise, denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition was filed before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Villamater is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.

RULING:
Yes.

In the case of Villamater, it is manifest that the interplay of age, hereditary, and dietary factors contributed to the development of colon cancer. By the time he signed his employment contract on June 4, 2002, he was already 58 years old, an age at which the incidence of colon cancer is more likely. He had a familial history of colon cancer. Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found his illness compensable for permanent and total disability, because they found that his dietary provisions while at sea increased the risk of contracting colon cancer because he had no choice of what to eat on board except those provided on the vessels and these consisted mainly of high-fat, high-cholesterol, and low-fiber foods.

While findings of the Labor Arbiter, which were affirmed by the NLRC, are entitled to great weight and are binding upon the courts, nonetheless, the Court finds it also worthy to note that even during the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, Villamater cited that the foods provided on board the vessels were mostly meat, high in fat and high in cholesterol. On this matter, noticeably, petitioners were silent when they argued that Villamater’s affliction was brought about by diet and genetics. It was only after the Labor Arbiter issued his Decision, finding colon cancer to be compensable because the risk was increased by the victuals provided on board, that petitioners started claiming that the foods available on the vessels also consisted of fresh fruits and vegetables, not to mention fish and poultry. It is also worth mentioning that while Dr. Salvador declared Villamater’s cancer “appears to be not work-related,” she nevertheless suggested to petitioners Disability Grade 1, which, under the POEA Standard Contract, “shall be considered or shall constitute total and permanent disability.” During his confinement in Hamburg, Germany, Villamater was diagnosed to have colon cancer and was advised to undergo chemotherapy and medical treatment, including blood transfusions. These findings were, in fact, confirmed by the findings of the company-designated physicians. The statement of Dr. Salvador that Villamater’s colon cancer “appears to be not work-related” remained at that, without any medical explanation to support the same. However, this statement, not definitive as it is, was negated by the same doctor’s suggestion of Disability Grade 1. Under Section 20-B of the POEA Standard Employment Contract, it is the company-designated physician who must certify that the seafarer has suffered permanent disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of his employment.

Sunday, August 25, 2013

MATIENZO vs. ABELLERA

MATIENZO vs. ABELLERA
G.R. No. L-45839 - June 1, 1988

FACTS:
The petitioners and private respondents are all authorized taxicab operators in Metro Manila. The respondents, however, admittedly operate “colorum” or “kabit” taxicab units. On or about the second week of February, 1977, private respondents filed their petitions with the respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) for the legalization of their unauthorized “excess” taxicab units citing PD 101, promulgated on January 17, 1973, “to eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators, by replacing or allowing them to become legitimate and responsible operators.” Within a matter of days, the respondent Board promulgated its orders setting the application for hearing and granting applicants provisional authority to operate their “excess taxicab units” for which legalization was sought.

Opposing the applications and seeking to restrain the grant of provisional permits or authority, as well as the annulment of permits already granted under PD 101, the petitioners allege that the BOT acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the petitions for legalization and awarding special permits to the private respondents. Citing Section 4 of PD 101, the petitioners argue that neither the BOT chairman nor any member thereof had the power, at the time the petitions were filed (i.e. in 1977), to legitimize the clandestine operations under PD 101 as such power had been limited to a period of six (6) months from and after the promulgation of the Decree on January 17, 1973. They state that, thereafter, the power lapses and becomes functus officio.

ISSUE:
Whether or not BOT can still legalize clandestine and unlawful taxicab operations under Section 1 of PD 101 despite the lapse of six (6) months after the promulgation of the Decree.

RULING:
Yes.

A reading of Section 1, PD 101, shows a grant of powers to the respondent Board to issue provisional permits as a step towards the legalization of colorum taxicab operations without the alleged time limitation. There is nothing in Section 4, cited by the petitioners, to suggest the expiration of such powers six (6) months after promulgation of the Decree. Rather, it merely provides for the withdrawal of the State’s waiver of its right to punish said colorum operators for their illegal acts. In other words, the cited section declares when the period of moratorium suspending the relentless drive to eliminate illegal operators shall end. Clearly, there is no impediment to the Board’s exercise of jurisdiction under its broad powers under the Public Service Act to issue certificates of public convenience to achieve the avowed purpose of PD 101 (Sec. 16a, Public Service Act, Nov. 7, 1936).


It is a settled principle of law that in determining whether a board or commission has a certain power, the authority given should be liberally construed in the light of the purposes for which it was created, and that which is incidentally necessary to a full implementation of the legislative intent should be upheld as germane to the law. Necessarily, too, where the end is required, the appropriate means are deemed given.

JAWORSKI vs. PAGCOR

JAWORSKI vs. PAGCOR
G.R. No. 144463 - January 14, 2004

FACTS:
The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a government owned and controlled corporation existing under PD No. 1869 issued on July 11, 1983 by then President Ferdinand Marcos.

On March 31, 1998, PAGCOR’s board of directors approved an instrument denominated as “Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming,” which granted Sports and Games and Entertainment Corporation (SAGE) the authority to operate and maintain Sports Betting station in PAGCOR’s casino locations, and Internet Gaming facilities to service local and international bettors, provided that to the satisfaction of PAGCOR, appropriate safeguards and procedures are established to ensure the integrity and fairness of the games. On September 1, 1998, PAGCOR, represented by its Chairperson, Alicia LI. Reyes, and SAGE, represented by its Chairman of the Board, Henry Sy, Jr., and its President, Antonio D. Lacdao, executed the above-named document. Pursuant to the authority granted by PAGCOR, SAGE commended its operations by conducting gambling on the Internet on a trial-run basis, making pre-paid cards and redemption of winnings available at various Bingo Bonanza outlets.

Petitioner Senator Robert Jaworski, in his capacity as member of the Senate and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Games, Amusement and Sports, filed the instant petition, praying that the grant of authority by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE be nullified. He maintains that PAGCOR committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it authorized SAGE to operate gambling on the internet. He contends that PAGCOR is not authorized under its legislative franchise, PD No. 1869, to operate gambling on the internet for the simple reason that the said decree could not have possibly contemplated internet gambling since at the time of its enactment on July 11, 1983 the internet was yet inexistent and gambling activities were confined exclusively to real-space. Further, he argues that the internet, being an international network of computers, necessarily transcends the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, and the grant to SAGE of authority to operate internet gambling contravenes the limitation of PAGCOR’s franchise, under Section 14 of PD No. 1869 which provides: “Place. – The Corporation [i.e., PAGCOR] shall conduct gambling activities or games of chance on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines. x x x.”

Moreover, according to petitioner, internet gambling does not fall under any of the categories of the authorized gambling activities enumerated under Section 10 of PD No. 1869 which grants PAGCOR the “right, privilege and authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement places, sports gaming pools, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines.” He contends that internet gambling could not have been included within the commonly accepted definition of “gambling casinos,” “clubs” or “other recreation or amusement places” as these terms refer to a physical  structure in real-space where people who intend to bet or gamble go and play games of chance authorized by law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PAGCOR is allowed to contract any of its franchise to another entity such as SAGE.

RULING:
No.

A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to corporations. It is a privilege of public concern which cannot be exercised at will and pleasure, but should be reserved for public control and administration, either by the government directly, or by public agents, under such conditions and regulations as the government may impose on them in the interest of the public. It is Congress that prescribes the conditions on which the grant of the franchise may be made. Thus the manner of granting the franchise, to whom it may be granted, the mode of conducting the business, the charter and the quality of the service to be rendered and the duty of the grantee to the public in exercising the franchise are almost always defined in clear and unequivocal language.

While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operator’s and/or management contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share its franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR cannot delegate its power in view of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly authorized to do so. In Lim v. Pacquing, the Court clarified that “since ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not so operate even if it has a license or permit from the City Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila.” By the same token, SAGE has to obtain a separate legislative franchise and not “ride on” PAGCOR’s franchise if it were to legally operate on-line Internet gambling.

Sunday, August 11, 2013

DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 127897 - November 15, 2001

FACTS:
Caltex Philippines entered into a contract of affreightment with the petitioner, Delsan Transport Lines, Inc., for a period of one year whereby the said common carrier agreed to transport Caltex’s industrial fuel oil from the Batangas-Bataan Refinery to different parts of the country. Under the contract, petitioner took on board its vessel, MT Maysun, 2,277.314 kiloliters of industrial fuel oil of Caltex to be delivered to the Caltex Oil Terminal in Zamboanga City. The shipment was insured with the private respondent, American Home Assurance Corporation.

On August 14, 1986, MT Maysun set sail from Batangas for Zamboanga City. Unfortunately, the vessel sank in the early morning of August 16, 1986 near Panay Gulf in the Visayas taking with it the entire cargo of fuel oil.

Subsequently, private respondent paid Caltex the sum of Five Million Ninety-Six Thousand Six Hundred Thirty-Five Pesos and Fifty-Seven Centavos (P5,096,635.57) representing the insured value of the lost cargo. Exercising its right of subrogation under Article 2207 of the New Civil Code, private respondent demanded of the petitioner the same amount it paid to Caltex. Due to its failure to collect from the petitioner despite prior demand, private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 137, for collection of a sum of money. After trial, the trial court rendered a decision on November 29, 1990 dismissing the complaint. The trial court found that the vessel, MT Maysun, was seaworthy and that the incident was caused by unexpected inclement weather condition or force majeure, thus, exempting the common carrier from liability for the loss of its cargo.

The decision of the trial court, however, was reversed, on appeal, by the Court of Appeals. The appellate court ruled that petitioner is liable on its obligation as common carrier to herein private respondent insurance company as subrogee of Caltex. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court. Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the payment made by private respondent to Caltex amounted to an automatic admission of the vessel’s seaworthiness.

RULING:
No.


The payment made by the private respondent for the insured value of the lost cargo operates as waiver of its (private respondent) right to enforce the term of the implied warranty against Caltex under the marine insurance policy. However, the same cannot be validly interpreted as an automatic admission of the vessel’s seaworthiness by the private respondent as to foreclose recourse against the petitioner for any liability under its contractual obligation as a common carrier. The fact of payment grants the private respondent subrogatory right which enables it to exercise legal remedies that would otherwise be available to Caltex as owner of the lost cargo against the petitioner common carrier.

Friday, August 2, 2013

ONG LIM SING, JR. vs. FEB LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION

ONG LIM SING, JR. vs. FEB LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION
G.R. No. 168115 - June 8, 2007

FACTS:
On March 9, 1995, FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation entered into a lease of equipment and motor vehicles with JVL Food Products. On the same date, Vicente Ong Lim Sing, Jr. executed an Individual Guaranty Agreement with FEB to guarantee the prompt and faithful performance of the terms and conditions of the aforesaid lease agreement. Corresponding Lease Schedules with Delivery and Acceptance Certificates over the equipment and motor vehicles formed part of the agreement. Under the contract, JVL was obliged to pay FEB an aggregate gross monthly rental of One Hundred Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Four Pesos (P170,494.00).

JVL defaulted in the payment of the monthly rentals. As of July 31, 2000, the amount in arrears, including the penalty charges and insurance premiums, amounted to Three Million Four Hundred Fourteen Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-Eight and 75/100 Pesos (P3,414,468.75). On August 23, 2000, FEB sent a letter to JVL demanding payment of the said amount. However, JVL failed to pay.

On December 6, 2000, FEB filed a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Manila for sum of money, damages, and replevin against JVL, Lim, and John Doe.

In an Amended Answer, JVL and Lim admitted the existence of the lease agreement but asserted that it is in reality a sale of equipment on instalment basis, with FEB acting as the financier. On November 22, 2002, the trial court ruled in favor of JVL and Lim and stressed the contradictory terms found in the lease agreement. The trial court stated, among others, that if JVL and Lim (then defendants) were to be regarded as only a lessee, logically the lessor who asserts ownership will be the one directly benefited or injured and therefore the lessee is not supposed to be the assured as he has no insurable interest.

On December 27, 2002, FEB filed its Notice of Appeal. Accordingly, on January 17, 2003, the court issued an Order elevating the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals. On March 15, 2005, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision declaring the transaction between the parties as a financial lease agreement. The said decision reversed and set aside the trial court’s decision dated November 22, 2002. Hence, Lim filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has an insurable interest in the equipment and motor vehicles leased.

RULING:
Yes.

The stipulation in Section 14 of the leased contract, that the equipment shall be insured at the cost and expense of the lessee against loss, damage, or destruction from fire, theft, accident, or other insurable risk for the full term of the lease, is a binding and valid stipulation. Petitioner, as a lessee, has an insurable interest in the equipment and motor vehicles leased. Section 17 of the Insurance Code provides that the measure of an insurable interest in property is the extent to which the insured might be damnified by loss or injury thereof. It cannot be denied that JVL will be directly damnified in case of loss, damage, or destruction of any of the properties leased.

Wednesday, July 24, 2013

LADECO vs. ANGALA

LADECO vs. ANGALA
G.R. No. 153076 - June 21, 2007

FACTS:
On May 4, 1993, at about 2:45 p.m., a Datsun crewcab with plate no. PEC-93 was driven by Apolonio Deocampo bumped into a 1958 Chevy pick-up with plate no. MAM-475 owned by Michael Raymond Angala and driven by Bernulfo Borres. Lapanday Agricultural Development Corporation (LADECO) owned the crewcab which was assigned to its manager Manuel Mendez. Deocampo was the driver and bodyguard of Mendez. Both vehicles were running along Rafael Castillo St., Agdao, Davao City heading north towards Lanang, Davao City. The left door, front left fender, and part of the front bumper of the pick-up were damaged.

Respondent Angala filed an action for Quasi-Delict, Damages, and Attorney’s fees against LADECO, its administrative officer Henry Berenguel and Deocampo. Respondent alleged that his pick-up was slowing down to about five to ten kilometers per hour (kph) and was making a left turn preparatory to turning south when it was bumped from behind by the crewcab which was running at around 60 to 70 kph. The crewcab stopped 21 meters from the point of impact. Respondent alleged that he heard a screeching sound before the impact. Respondent was seated beside the driver and was looking at the speedometer when the accident took place. Respondent testified that Borres made a signal because he noticed a blinking light while looking at the speedometer.

Respondent sent a demand letter to LADEDO for the payment of the damages he incurred because of the accident but he did not receive any reply. Thus, respondent filed the case against LADECO, Berenguel, and Deocampo.

In its March 3, 1995 Decision, the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 15 ruled in favor of defendant and ordered LADECO and Deocampo to solidarily pay the damages. The trial court found that Berenguel was not liable because he was not the owner of the crewcab. LADECO and Deocampo filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied on June 13, 1995.

Petitioner filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. However, the appellate court affirmed in toto the trial court’s decision. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In its March 11, 2002 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition was filed before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance applies in the case at bar.

RULING:
Yes.

Since both parties are at fault in this case, the doctrine of last clear chance applies

The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who has the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so is chargeable with the loss. In this case, Deocampo had the last clear chance to avoid the collision. Since Deocampo was driving the rear vehicle, he had full control of the situation since he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. Deocampo had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him. A U-turn is done at a much slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning, compared to running straight ahead. Deocampo could have avoided the vehicle if he was not driving very fast while following the pick-up. Deocampo was not only driving fast, he also admitted that he did not step on the brakes even upon seeing the pick-up. He only stepped on the brakes after the collision.

Friday, July 19, 2013

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

CREATION AND ABOLITION OF AGENCIES
        §        Public office – right, authority and duty, created by law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the appointing power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by that individual for the benefit of the public.
      – a public trust or responsibility, and embraces the idea of term, duration, emoluments, powers and duties.

  v  The creation of public offices is primarily a legislative function.
>>>   In so far as the legislative power in this respect is not restricted by constitutional provisions, it is supreme, and the legislature may decide for itself what offices are suitable, necessary, or convenient.

  v  All offices created by the legislature are wholly within the power of that body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the office and the powers and duties of the office holders, and, if it sees fit, abolish the office.

REORGANIZATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

Definition of Reorganization
      §        Reorganization – process of restructuring the bureaucracy’s organizational and functional set-up, to make it more viable in terms of the economy, efficiency, effectiveness and make it more responsive to the needs of its public clientele as authorized by law.
         – means used by the legislature to reorganize or abolish offices, which it may do so by law directly or indirectly by authorizing an executive department or agency to reorganize the office.

Basis of the President’s Power to Reorganize
  v  The exercise of the power of reorganization or abolition of offices must be made in good faith, otherwise the same may be declared invalid.

        ª       Evidence of bad faith (RA 6656):
1)       Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned;
2)       Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions us created;
3)       Where incumbents were replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit;
4)       Where there is a classification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices; and
5)       Where the removal violates the order of separation.

Bases of Power to Reorganize
        1)       Section 62 of RA 7645
Ø  Sec. 62. Unauthorized organizational changes. – Unless otherwise created by law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no organizational unit or changes in key positions in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organizational structures and be funded from appropriations by this Act.
>>> The President is authorized to effect organizational changes, including the creation of offices in the department or agency concerned.

        2)       Section 20, Book III of the 1987 Administrative Code
Ø  Sec. 20. Residual Powers. – Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law.

        3)       Presidential Decree Nos. 1416 and 1772
           >>> These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate, bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials.


        4)       Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of the 1987 Administrative Code
Ø  Sec. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. – The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Order and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President.

Limitations on the Power of Other Agencies to Reorganize
  v  The exercise of the power of reorganization or abolition of offices must be made in good faith, otherwise the same may be declared invalid.

  v  A reorganization is improper or invalid when effected without observing the prescribed priorities in retention and separation of the personnel concerned taking into account all the relevant factors involved.

ª       Order of separation (Sec. 3, RA 6656):
a)       Casual employees with less than five (5) years of government service;
b)       Casual employee with five (5) years of government service;
c)       Employees holding temporary appointments; and
d)       Employees holding permanent appointments: Provided, That those in the same category as enumerated above, who are least qualified in terms of performance and merit shall be laid off first, length of service notwithstanding.

  v  No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing.

  v  Officers and employees who are separated from the service as a result of a valid reorganization are entitled to separation and other retirement benefits accruing to them by reason of the termination of their services.
     
   v   The power granted to an executive agency to reorganize itself covers only offices falling under said agency and not those attached thereto.


PURPOSES FOR CREATING ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
    1)       To unclog court dockets. To relieve courts of the burden of resolving all controversies, specialized agencies have been created to hear and decide particular disputes.
    2)       To meet the growing complexities of modern society. As problems of modern society multiply, which can hardly be met by the legislature, administrative agencies are established to promptly cope up with such problems.
    3)       To help in the regulation of ramified activities of a developing country.
    4)       To entrust to specialized agencies in specified fields with their special knowledge, experience, and capability the task of dealing with problems thereof as they have the experience, expertise and power of dispatch to provide solutions thereto.

COMMON TYPES OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
     1)       Agencies created to function in situations wherein the government is offering some gratuity, grant, or special privileges.
ü  Philippine Veterans Board
ü  Board on Pensions for Veterans
ü  Philippine Veterans Administration
ü  Government Service Insurance System
ü  Social Security System

    2)       Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to carry on certain governmental functions.
ü  Bureau of Immigration
ü  Bureau of Internal Revenue
ü  Board of Special Inquiry and Board of Commissioners
ü  Civil Service Commission
ü  Central Bank

    3)       Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is performing some business service for the public.
ü  Bureau of Posts
ü  Postal Savings Bank
ü  Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerages Authority
ü  Philippine National Railways
ü  Civil Aeronautics Administration

   4)       Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to regulate business affected with public interest.
ü  Fiber Inspection Board
ü  Philippines Patent Office
ü   Office of the Insurance Commissioner

  5)       Agencies set up to function in situations where the government is seeking under police power to regulate private business and individuals.
ü  Securities and Exchange Commission
ü  Board of Food Inspectors
ü  Board of Review of Motion Pictures
ü  Professional Regulatory Commission

   6)       Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to adjust individual controversies because of some strong social policy involved.
ü  National Labor Relations Commission
ü  Court of Agrarian Relations
ü  Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor
ü  Bureau of Labor Standards
ü  Women and Minors Bureau

  7)       Agencies set up to function in situations where the government is seeking to conduct investigations and gather evidence for information, recommendation or prosecution of crimes.
ü  Commission on Human Rights
ü  National Bureau of Investigation

ü  Prosecutor’s Office

Tuesday, July 16, 2013

TITLE II - TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT OF SPECIAL WORKERS (Labor Code of the Philippines)

TITLE II – TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT OF SPECIAL WORKERS

Chapter 1 – Apprentices

Article 57. Statement of Objectives
        ª       Objectives:
1)       To help meet the demand of the economy for trained manpower;
2)       To establish a national apprenticeship program through the participation of employers, workers and government and non-government agencies; and
3)       To establish apprenticeship standards for the protection of apprentices.

Article 58. Definition of Terms
        §       Apprenticeship – practical training on the job supplemented by related theoretical instruction.

       §       Apprentice – worker who is covered by a written apprenticeship agreement with an individual employer or any of the entities recognized under the law.

       §       Apprenticeable occupation – any trade, form of employment or occupation which requires more than three (3) months of practical training on the job with compulsory related theoretical instructions.

       §       On-the-job training – practical work experience through actual participation in productive activities given to or acquired by an apprentice.

Significance
  v  It fills the demand of employers for workers in certain trades or occupations which require special skills.

Article 59. Qualifications of Apprentice
        ª       Qualifications:
1)       Be at least fourteen (14) years of age;
2)       Be physically fit for the occupation in which he desires to be trained;
3)       Possess vocational aptitude and capacity for the particular occupation as established through appropriate tests; and
4)       Posses the ability to comprehend and follow oral and written instructions.

Article 60. Employment of Apprentices
        §       Highly technical industry – a trade, business, enterprise, industry or other activity which utilizes the application of advanced technology.

Article 61. Contents of Apprenticeship Agreements
        §       Apprenticeship contract/agreement – an agreement whereby the employer binds himself to train the apprentice and the apprentice in turn accepts the terms of the training for a recognized apprenticeable occupation emphasizing the rights, duties and responsibilities of each party.

        ª       Contents:
1)       Full name and address of the contracting parties;
2)       Date of birth of the apprentice;
3)       Name of trade, occupation or job in which the apprentice will be trained and the dates on which such training will begin and will approximately end;
4)       Approximate number of hours of on-the-job training with compulsory theoretical instructions which the apprentice shall undergo during his training;
5)       Schedule of the work processes of the trade/occupation in which the apprentice shall be trained and the approximate time to be spent on the job in each process;
6)       Graduated scale of wages to be paid the apprentice;
7)       Probationary period of the apprentice during which either party may summarily terminate their agreement;
8)       A clause that if the employer is unable to fulfil his training obligation, he may transfer the agreement, with the consent of the apprentice, to any other employer who is willing to assume such obligation.

  v  The period of apprenticeship contract shall not exceed six (6) months.

Termination of Contract
        ª       Causes for termination (by the employer):
1)       Habitual absenteeism in on-the-job training with compulsory theoretical instructions;
2)       Wilful disobedience of company rules or insubordination of lawful order of a superior;
3)       Poor physical condition, permanent disability or prolonged illness which incapacitates the apprentice from working;
4)       Theft or malicious destruction of company property and/or equipment;
5)       Poor efficiency of performance on the job or in the classroom for a prolonged period despite warnings duly given to the apprentice; and
6)       Engaging in violence or other forms of gross misconduct inside the employer’s premises. 

        ª       Causes for termination (by the apprentice):
1)       Substandard or deleterious working conditions within the employer’s premises;
2)       Repeated violations by the employer of the terms of the apprenticeship agreement;
3)       Cruel or inhuman treatment by the employer or his subordinates;
4)       Personal problems which in the opinion of the apprentice shall prevent him from a satisfactory performance of his job; and
5)       Bad health or continuing illness.

Apprentice’s Compensation
  v  The wage rate of the apprentice shall start at seventy-five percent (75%) of the statutory minimum wage for the first six (6) months; thereafter, he shall be paid the full minimum wage, including the full cost-of-living allowance.

Apprenticeship Period as Probationary Period
         §       Probationary period – span of time within which the employer is able to determine the employee’s fitness, characteristics, and habits to a given job.

         §       After the training period, they shall no more undergo a probationary period for this would amount to double probation proscribed under the law.

Article 62. Signing of Apprenticeship Agreement
  v  An apprenticeship agreement entered into by the parties should be ratified by an appropriate apprenticeship committee.

         ª       Duties of apprenticeship committee:
1)       Act as liaison between the apprentice and the employer;
2)       Mediate and/or settle in the first instance differences between the employer and the apprentices arising out of an apprenticeship agreement;
3)       Maintain a constant follow-up on the technical progress of the program and of the apprentices in particular;
4)       Recommend to the Apprenticeship Division of the Regional Office concerned the issuance of certificates of completion to apprentices.

Article 63. Venue of Apprenticeship Programs
        ª       Venues of apprenticeship training programs:
1)       Sponsoring firm’s or employer’s premises;
2)       Training centers of the DOLE; or
3)       Public training institutions, or a combination of both.

Article 64. Sponsoring of Apprenticeship Program
  v  Any apprenticeship schemes may be undertaken or sponsored by a single employer or firm or by a group or association thereof, or by a civic organization.

Article 65.  Investigation of Violation of Apprenticeship Agreement
  v  Upon complaint of any interested person or upon its own initiative, the DOLE or its authorized representative shall investigate any violation of an apprenticeship agreement pursuant to such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary.

Article 66. Appeal to the Secretary of Labor and Employment
  v  The decision of the authorized agency of the DOLE may be appealed by any aggrieved person to the Secretary of Labor within five (5) days from receipt of the decision.

  v  The decision of the Secretary of Labor shall be final and executory.

Article 67. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
  v  When an administrative reedy is provided by law, relief must first be sought by exhausting such remedies before the courts will act.

  v  The plant apprenticeship committee shall have initial responsibility for settling differences arising out of such apprenticeship contract.

Article 68. Aptitude Testing of Applicants
  v  An employer who has a recognized apprenticeship program shall provide aptitude tests to apprentices-applicants.

  v  If the employer does not have the adequate facilities, the DOLE may provide the service free of charge.

Article 69. Responsibility for Theoretical Instruction
  v  Compulsory theoretical instructions to apprentices may be undertaken by the employer himself if he has adequate facilities and qualified instructors for the purpose.

Article 70. Voluntary Organization of Apprenticeship Programs; Exemptions
  v  Primarily, an apprenticeship is a voluntary undertaking.

        ª       Exemptions:
1)       When national security or particular requirements of economic development so demand; and
2)       Where service of foreign technicians are utilized by private companies in apprenticeable trades.

Article 71. Deductibility of Training Costs
  v  The purpose is to provide an incentive in the form of additional tax deduction to persons or enterprises undertaking apprenticeship programs.

Article 72. Apprentices without Compensation
         ª       Apprenticeship without compensation:
1)       A pre-requisite for graduation; or
2)       A requirement for taking a governmental board examination.


Chapter 2 – Learners

Article 73. Learners Defined
        §       Learner – person hired as a trainee in semi-skilled and other industrial occupations which are non-appreticeable.

Article 74. When Learners May Be Hired
  v  Learners may be employed when no experienced workers are available.

  v  A minor below fifteen (15) years of age shall not be eligible for employment as a learner.

  v  Those below eighteen (18) years of age may be employed in non-hazardous occupations.

Article 75. Learnership Agreement
        §       Learnership agreement – employment and training contract entered into between the employer and the learner.

        ª       Contents:
1)       The names and addresses of the employer and the learner;
2)       The occupation to be learned and the duration for the training period which shall not exceed three (3) months;
3)       The wage of the learner which shall be at least 75% of the applicable minimum wage; and
4)       A commitment to employ the learner if he so desires, as a regular employee upon completion of training.

  v  A leaner who has worked during the first two months shall be deemed as regular employee if training is terminated by the employer before the end of the stipulated period through no fault of the learner.

Article 76. Learners in Piecework
  v  Learners working on piece or incentive-rate jobs are entitled to full pay for work done during their training period.

Article 77. Penalty Clause
  v  A fine of not less than P1,000.00 or more than P10,000.00 or imprisonment for not less than three months nor more than three years at the discretion of the court.


Chapter 3 – Handicapped Workers

Article 78. Definition
         §       Handicapped workers – one whose capacity is impaired by age or physical or mental deficiency or injury.

         §       Disable worker – one whose earning capacity is impaired by mental, physical or sensory deficiency or injury (RA 7277).

Access to Equal Work Opportunities
  v  No disable person shall be denied access to opportunities for suitable employment.

Employer’s Incentives for Employing Disabled Persons
  v  Additional deduction from their gross income, equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the total amount paid as salaries and wages to disabled persons.

Article 80. Employment Agreement
        ª       Contents:
1)       The names and addresses of the employer and the handicapped worker;
2)       The rate of pay of the handicapped worker which shall not be less than 75% of the legal minimum wage;
3)       The nature of the work to be performed by the handicapped worker; and
4)       The duration of employment.

Article 81. Eligibility for Apprenticeship
  v  Handicapped workers are eligible for employment as apprentices or learners if their handicap is such that it does not impede the performance of job operations in the particular trade or occupation which is the subject of the apprenticeship or learnership program.