That one money/energy/sanity-draining semester..

Second Year – First Semester

Alright, another semester is over. Akalain mo yun, naka-tatlong sem na ako sa law school. Kuddos!

So far, this sem is the most money/energy/sanity-draining sem I had in law school. I experienced so many things, as in!

Naranasan ko umabsent sa isang subject para lang makapag-aral sa isa pang subject. Frustrating pag wala palang klase o recit, sayang yung pag-absent mo dun sa isa. Naranasan ko matulog ng 4am, at gumising ng 8am para lang makapagreview. Naranasan ko matawag sa recitation for three consecutive meetings. Yung parang twenty minutes na lang at uwian na, natawag ka pa. Naranasan ko tumayo for almost two hours dahil sa recitation. Hindi pwedeng umupo hangga't hindi satisfied si Atty. sa mga sagot mo. Buhay nga naman. Hahaha. Pero naranasan ko rin na hindi matawag sa recit for a month, na nagagalit na yung mga kaklase ko dahil hindi ako natatawag. But I guess I paid the price for that when I failed the subject. Traggic.

First time, ever, ko makakuha ng FAILED (F) na final grade. Something I should be sad about, but it’s good that I already accepted the failure even before I saw it. Friday pa lang, pagkabigay ng test questionnaire, tinanggap ko na. Hahaha. When I opened my SIS account, natulala lang ako sandali tapos okay na, hindi na ako naiyak or nagulat. Parang mas magugulat pa ako kung Passed (P) ang nakita ko. Salamat pa rin sa experience, Atty. Salao. Dahil po sa inyo, kasama na ako sa "General Rule." Hehehe. Administrative Law, I’ll see you again next sem. Magtutuos tayo. Aja!

At sa only major subject ko, Property, sobrang thankful ko po nung nakita ko yung grade ko. Sabi ko nga, tinapay lang po yung hiningi ko, pero yung binigay ni Bro, may palaman pa at may kasama pang soft drinks. The best! Salamat, Fiscal Luna.

Pero yung grade na nagpaiyak sa’kin – TRES (3.0). Galing kay Atty. Mercado, professor ko sa Special Contracts. Sobrang thankful ko po dyan, promise! First time ko rin makakuha ng tres pero alam mo yun, priceless. Tagalang sa mga ganitong pagkakataon, mamahalin mo talaga sya. Thank you so much, Sir! Salamat po ulit sa J.Co. Hehehe.

After seeing these grades, I can finally say na law student na nga talaga ako. Hahaha. Hindi pwedeng petiks, hindi pwedeng pwede na, dapat first day pa lang ng klase, magpondo ka na para hindi mahirapan humabol. I learned it the hard way, but still, the most important thing is to keep on moving forward. Just continue, move on, and never give up. Aja!

Salamat, Bro! I owe You everything.

“Lord, give me the strength to accept the things that I cannot change; the courage to change the things that I can; and the wisdom to know the difference.”

x, Aia Tibayan Metrillo

GREAT SOUTHERN MARITIME SERVICES CORP. vs. SURIGAO

GREAT SOUTHERN MARITIME SERVICES CORP. vs. SURIGAO

G.R. No. 183646 – September 18, 2009

FACTS:

Respondent Leonila Surigao’s husband, the late Salvador M. Surigao, was hired as Fitter by petitioner Great Southern Maritime Corporation, for and in behalf of co-petitioner IMC Shipping Co. Pte., Ltd. (Singapore) for a period of ten (10) months. In his pre-employment medical examination (PEME), he was found fit for sea duty. Thus, on April 29, 2001, he commenced his work aboard M/V Selendang Nilam.

However, on August 22, 2001, as per Ship Master’s advice, a doctor was sent on board the vessel to medically attend to Salvador due to complaints of extensive neuro dermatitis, neck region viral, aetiology, urticaria, macula popular, rash extending to the face, chest and abdomen. After examination, Salvador was advised to take a blood test. His condition having worsened, he was confined at the Seven Hills Hospital. Not long thereafter, the Ship Master decided to sign him off from the vessel on August 25, 2001 for treatment in the hospital and for repatriation upon certification of the doctor that he was fit to travel. Prior to his repatriation, though, or on August 26, 2001, Salvador was found dead inside the bathroom of his hospital room. Later, the body was transferred to a government hospital, the Ling George Hospital Mortuary Hall, for post-mortem examination. The Post-Mortem Certificate issued by the Department of Forensic Medicine, Visakhapatnam City, stated that the cause of death of Salvador was asphyxia due to hanging.

As an heir of the deceased seaman, petitioner, for and in behalf of her minor children, filed for death compensation benefits under the terms of the standard employment contract, but her claims were denied by the petitioners. On October 28, 2003, the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision ordering petitioners to pay the amount of $71,500 or its equivalent in Philippine pesos at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of actual payment representing the death benefits, burial expenses of the deceased Salvador and attorney’s fees.

On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter and declared petitioners not liable for death benefits. In lieu thereof, however, the commission directed the petitioners to grant financial assistance to the respondent in the amount of $5,000. Respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision, but the commission in a Resolution dated May 24, 2007, denied the same.

Respondent thereafter elevated the case to the appellate court which reversed the decision of the NLRC and reinstated that of the Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals found that Salvador did not commit suicide; hence, respondents are entitled to receive death benefits. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated July 8, 2008. Hence, the present petition was filed before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners are liable to pay the death benefits being claimed.

RULING:

No.

The general rule is that the employer is liable to pay the heirs of the deceased seafarer for death benefits once it is established that he died during the effectivity of his employment contract. However, the employer may be exempted from liability if he can successfully prove that the seafarer’s death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or wilful act. In sum, respondents’ entitlement to any death benefits depends on whether the evidence if the petitioners suffices to prove that the deceased committed suicide; the burden of proof rests on his employer.

The post-mortem examination conclusively established that the true cause of death was asphyxia or suffocation. The appellate court’s ruling that while it may be consistent with the theory that the deceased hanged himself but it does not rule out the possibility that he might have died of other causes, does not persuade. Aside from being purely speculative, the Court finds it hard to believe that someone strangled Salvador inside the bathroom then locked the door thereof on his way out undetected. As shown by the evidence presented by the petitioners, the bathroom door was locked or bolted from the inside and could not be opened from outside. In order to gain entrance, the hospital staff had to pass through a closed door with a mess leading to the ceiling of the bathroom. Entry could not likewise be effected through the bathroom window as it has grills.

Moreover, the conclusion that Salvador could not have hanged himself to the showerhead as he was found lying on the floor with a belt tied around his neck; or that he could not have died since the pipe broke down and he fell therefrom, are based on speculations and hypothetical in nature. This confusion could have been avoided had the Court of Appeals and the Labor Arbiter considered the most logical possibility that Salvador died hanging on the showerhead before the pipe broke down due to his body weight, and thus, explaining why he was found on the floor with the belt still on his neck and broken pipe and showerhead near his lifeless body. That the post-mortem examination, the Certification of Dr. Raju and the police inquest report, all stated that Salvador’s cause of death was asphyxia due to hanging, and not due to any the injury, lead to a fair and just conclusion that Salvador was already dead before the showerhead broke.

LEONIS NAVIGATION CO., INC. vs. VILLAMATER

LEONIS NAVIGATION CO., INC. vs. VILLAMATER

G.R. No. 179169 – March 3, 2010

FACTS:

Private respondent Catalino U. Villamater was hired as Chief Engineer for the ship M/V Nord Monaco, owned by petitioner World Marine Panama, S.A., through the services of petitioner Leonis Navigation Co., Inc., as the latter’s local manning agent. Consequent to this employment, Villamater, on June 4, 2002, executed an employment contract, incorporating the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels as prescribed by the POEA. Prior to his deployment, Villamater underwent the required Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME). He passed the PEME and was declared “Fit to Work.” Thereafter, Villamater was deployed on June 26, 2002.

Sometime in October 2002, Villamater suffered intestinal bleeding and was given a blood transfusion. Thereafter, he again felt weak, lost considerable weight, and suffered intermittent intestinal pain. He consulted a physician in Hamburg, Germany, who advised hospital confinement. Villamater was diagnosed with Obstructive Adenocarcinoma of the Sigmoid, with multiple liver matastases, possibly local peritoneal carcinosis and infiltration of the bladder, possibly lung metastasis, and anemia; Candida Esophagitis; and Chronic Gastritis. He was advised to undergo chemotherapy and continuous supportive treatment, such as pain-killers and blood transfusion. Villamater was later repatriated, under medical escort, as soon as he was deemed fit to travel. As soon as he arrived in the Philippines, Villamater was referred to company-designated physicians. The diagnosis and the recommended treatment abroad were confirmed. He was advised to undergo six (6) cycles of chemotherapy. However, Dr. Kelly Siy Salvador, one of the company-designated physicians, opined that Villamater’s condition “appears to be not work-related,” but suggested disability grading of 1.

In the course of his chemotherapy, when no noticeable improvement occurred, Villamater filed a complaint before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC for payment of permanent and total disability benefits in the amount of $80,000, reimbursement of medical and hospitalization expenses in the amount of P11,393.65, moral damages in the sum of P1,000,000, exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000, as well as attorney’s fees. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dated July 28, 2003 in favor of Villamater, holding that his illness was compensable, but denying his claim for moral and exemplary damages.

Petitioners appealed to the NLRC. Villamater also filed his own appeal, questioning the award of the Labor Arbiter and claiming that the 100% degree of disability should be compensated in the amount of $80,000. On February 4, 2004, the NLRC issued its resolution dismissing the respective appeals of both parties and affirming in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of the February 4, 2004 resolution, but the NLRC denied the same. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals. On May 3, 2007, the appellate court rendered its assailed decision dismissing the petition. The appellate court, likewise, denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition was filed before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Villamater is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.

RULING:

Yes.

In the case of Villamater, it is manifest that the interplay of age, hereditary, and dietary factors contributed to the development of colon cancer. By the time he signed his employment contract on June 4, 2002, he was already 58 years old, an age at which the incidence of colon cancer is more likely. He had a familial history of colon cancer. Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found his illness compensable for permanent and total disability, because they found that his dietary provisions while at sea increased the risk of contracting colon cancer because he had no choice of what to eat on board except those provided on the vessels and these consisted mainly of high-fat, high-cholesterol, and low-fiber foods.

While findings of the Labor Arbiter, which were affirmed by the NLRC, are entitled to great weight and are binding upon the courts, nonetheless, the Court finds it also worthy to note that even during the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, Villamater cited that the foods provided on board the vessels were mostly meat, high in fat and high in cholesterol. On this matter, noticeably, petitioners were silent when they argued that Villamater’s affliction was brought about by diet and genetics. It was only after the Labor Arbiter issued his Decision, finding colon cancer to be compensable because the risk was increased by the victuals provided on board, that petitioners started claiming that the foods available on the vessels also consisted of fresh fruits and vegetables, not to mention fish and poultry. It is also worth mentioning that while Dr. Salvador declared Villamater’s cancer “appears to be not work-related,” she nevertheless suggested to petitioners Disability Grade 1, which, under the POEA Standard Contract, “shall be considered or shall constitute total and permanent disability.” During his confinement in Hamburg, Germany, Villamater was diagnosed to have colon cancer and was advised to undergo chemotherapy and medical treatment, including blood transfusions. These findings were, in fact, confirmed by the findings of the company-designated physicians. The statement of Dr. Salvador that Villamater’s colon cancer “appears to be not work-related” remained at that, without any medical explanation to support the same. However, this statement, not definitive as it is, was negated by the same doctor’s suggestion of Disability Grade 1. Under Section 20-B of the POEA Standard Employment Contract, it is the company-designated physician who must certify that the seafarer has suffered permanent disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of his employment.

MATIENZO vs. ABELLERA

MATIENZO vs. ABELLERA

G.R. No. L-45839 - June 1, 1988

FACTS:

The petitioners and private respondents are all authorized taxicab operators in Metro Manila. The respondents, however, admittedly operate “colorum” or “kabit” taxicab units. On or about the second week of February, 1977, private respondents filed their petitions with the respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) for the legalization of their unauthorized “excess” taxicab units citing PD 101, promulgated on January 17, 1973, “to eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators, by replacing or allowing them to become legitimate and responsible operators.” Within a matter of days, the respondent Board promulgated its orders setting the application for hearing and granting applicants provisional authority to operate their “excess taxicab units” for which legalization was sought.

Opposing the applications and seeking to restrain the grant of provisional permits or authority, as well as the annulment of permits already granted under PD 101, the petitioners allege that the BOT acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the petitions for legalization and awarding special permits to the private respondents. Citing Section 4 of PD 101, the petitioners argue that neither the BOT chairman nor any member thereof had the power, at the time the petitions were filed (i.e. in 1977), to legitimize the clandestine operations under PD 101 as such power had been limited to a period of six (6) months from and after the promulgation of the Decree on January 17, 1973. They state that, thereafter, the power lapses and becomes functus officio.

ISSUE:

Whether or not BOT can still legalize clandestine and unlawful taxicab operations under Section 1 of PD 101 despite the lapse of six (6) months after the promulgation of the Decree.

RULING:

Yes.

A reading of Section 1, PD 101, shows a grant of powers to the respondent Board to issue provisional permits as a step towards the legalization of colorum taxicab operations without the alleged time limitation. There is nothing in Section 4, cited by the petitioners, to suggest the expiration of such powers six (6) months after promulgation of the Decree. Rather, it merely provides for the withdrawal of the State’s waiver of its right to punish said colorum operators for their illegal acts. In other words, the cited section declares when the period of moratorium suspending the relentless drive to eliminate illegal operators shall end. Clearly, there is no impediment to the Board’s exercise of jurisdiction under its broad powers under the Public Service Act to issue certificates of public convenience to achieve the avowed purpose of PD 101 (Sec. 16a, Public Service Act, Nov. 7, 1936).

It is a settled principle of law that in determining whether a board or commission has a certain power, the authority given should be liberally construed in the light of the purposes for which it was created, and that which is incidentally necessary to a full implementation of the legislative intent should be upheld as germane to the law. Necessarily, too, where the end is required, the appropriate means are deemed given.

JAWORSKI vs. PAGCOR

JAWORSKI vs. PAGCOR

G.R. No. 144463 - January 14, 2004

FACTS:

The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a government owned and controlled corporation existing under PD No. 1869 issued on July 11, 1983 by then President Ferdinand Marcos.

On March 31, 1998, PAGCOR’s board of directors approved an instrument denominated as “Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming,” which granted Sports and Games and Entertainment Corporation (SAGE) the authority to operate and maintain Sports Betting station in PAGCOR’s casino locations, and Internet Gaming facilities to service local and international bettors, provided that to the satisfaction of PAGCOR, appropriate safeguards and procedures are established to ensure the integrity and fairness of the games. On September 1, 1998, PAGCOR, represented by its Chairperson, Alicia LI. Reyes, and SAGE, represented by its Chairman of the Board, Henry Sy, Jr., and its President, Antonio D. Lacdao, executed the above-named document. Pursuant to the authority granted by PAGCOR, SAGE commended its operations by conducting gambling on the Internet on a trial-run basis, making pre-paid cards and redemption of winnings available at various Bingo Bonanza outlets.

Petitioner Senator Robert Jaworski, in his capacity as member of the Senate and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Games, Amusement and Sports, filed the instant petition, praying that the grant of authority by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE be nullified. He maintains that PAGCOR committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it authorized SAGE to operate gambling on the internet. He contends that PAGCOR is not authorized under its legislative franchise, PD No. 1869, to operate gambling on the internet for the simple reason that the said decree could not have possibly contemplated internet gambling since at the time of its enactment on July 11, 1983 the internet was yet inexistent and gambling activities were confined exclusively to real-space. Further, he argues that the internet, being an international network of computers, necessarily transcends the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, and the grant to SAGE of authority to operate internet gambling contravenes the limitation of PAGCOR’s franchise, under Section 14 of PD No. 1869 which provides: “Place. – The Corporation [i.e., PAGCOR] shall conduct gambling activities or games of chance on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines. x x x.”

Moreover, according to petitioner, internet gambling does not fall under any of the categories of the authorized gambling activities enumerated under Section 10 of PD No. 1869 which grants PAGCOR the “right, privilege and authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement places, sports gaming pools, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines.” He contends that internet gambling could not have been included within the commonly accepted definition of “gambling casinos,” “clubs” or “other recreation or amusement places” as these terms refer to a physical  structure in real-space where people who intend to bet or gamble go and play games of chance authorized by law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PAGCOR is allowed to contract any of its franchise to another entity such as SAGE.

RULING:

No.

A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to corporations. It is a privilege of public concern which cannot be exercised at will and pleasure, but should be reserved for public control and administration, either by the government directly, or by public agents, under such conditions and regulations as the government may impose on them in the interest of the public. It is Congress that prescribes the conditions on which the grant of the franchise may be made. Thus the manner of granting the franchise, to whom it may be granted, the mode of conducting the business, the charter and the quality of the service to be rendered and the duty of the grantee to the public in exercising the franchise are almost always defined in clear and unequivocal language.

While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operator’s and/or management contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share its franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR cannot delegate its power in view of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly authorized to do so. In Lim v. Pacquing, the Court clarified that “since ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not so operate even if it has a license or permit from the City Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila.” By the same token, SAGE has to obtain a separate legislative franchise and not “ride on” PAGCOR’s franchise if it were to legally operate on-line Internet gambling.

DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 127897 - November 15, 2001

FACTS:

Caltex Philippines entered into a contract of affreightment with the petitioner, Delsan Transport Lines, Inc., for a period of one year whereby the said common carrier agreed to transport Caltex’s industrial fuel oil from the Batangas-Bataan Refinery to different parts of the country. Under the contract, petitioner took on board its vessel, MT Maysun, 2,277.314 kiloliters of industrial fuel oil of Caltex to be delivered to the Caltex Oil Terminal in Zamboanga City. The shipment was insured with the private respondent, American Home Assurance Corporation.

On August 14, 1986, MT Maysun set sail from Batangas for Zamboanga City. Unfortunately, the vessel sank in the early morning of August 16, 1986 near Panay Gulf in the Visayas taking with it the entire cargo of fuel oil.

Subsequently, private respondent paid Caltex the sum of Five Million Ninety-Six Thousand Six Hundred Thirty-Five Pesos and Fifty-Seven Centavos (P5,096,635.57) representing the insured value of the lost cargo. Exercising its right of subrogation under Article 2207 of the New Civil Code, private respondent demanded of the petitioner the same amount it paid to Caltex. Due to its failure to collect from the petitioner despite prior demand, private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 137, for collection of a sum of money. After trial, the trial court rendered a decision on November 29, 1990 dismissing the complaint. The trial court found that the vessel, MT Maysun, was seaworthy and that the incident was caused by unexpected inclement weather condition or force majeure, thus, exempting the common carrier from liability for the loss of its cargo.

The decision of the trial court, however, was reversed, on appeal, by the Court of Appeals. The appellate court ruled that petitioner is liable on its obligation as common carrier to herein private respondent insurance company as subrogee of Caltex. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court. Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the payment made by private respondent to Caltex amounted to an automatic admission of the vessel’s seaworthiness.

RULING:

No.

The payment made by the private respondent for the insured value of the lost cargo operates as waiver of its (private respondent) right to enforce the term of the implied warranty against Caltex under the marine insurance policy. However, the same cannot be validly interpreted as an automatic admission of the vessel’s seaworthiness by the private respondent as to foreclose recourse against the petitioner for any liability under its contractual obligation as a common carrier. The fact of payment grants the private respondent subrogatory right which enables it to exercise legal remedies that would otherwise be available to Caltex as owner of the lost cargo against the petitioner common carrier.

ONG LIM SING, JR. vs. FEB LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION

ONG LIM SING, JR. vs. FEB LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION

G.R. No. 168115 - June 8, 2007

FACTS:

On March 9, 1995, FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation entered into a lease of equipment and motor vehicles with JVL Food Products. On the same date, Vicente Ong Lim Sing, Jr. executed an Individual Guaranty Agreement with FEB to guarantee the prompt and faithful performance of the terms and conditions of the aforesaid lease agreement. Corresponding Lease Schedules with Delivery and Acceptance Certificates over the equipment and motor vehicles formed part of the agreement. Under the contract, JVL was obliged to pay FEB an aggregate gross monthly rental of One Hundred Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Four Pesos (P170,494.00).

JVL defaulted in the payment of the monthly rentals. As of July 31, 2000, the amount in arrears, including the penalty charges and insurance premiums, amounted to Three Million Four Hundred Fourteen Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-Eight and 75/100 Pesos (P3,414,468.75). On August 23, 2000, FEB sent a letter to JVL demanding payment of the said amount. However, JVL failed to pay.

On December 6, 2000, FEB filed a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Manila for sum of money, damages, and replevin against JVL, Lim, and John Doe.

In an Amended Answer, JVL and Lim admitted the existence of the lease agreement but asserted that it is in reality a sale of equipment on instalment basis, with FEB acting as the financier. On November 22, 2002, the trial court ruled in favor of JVL and Lim and stressed the contradictory terms found in the lease agreement. The trial court stated, among others, that if JVL and Lim (then defendants) were to be regarded as only a lessee, logically the lessor who asserts ownership will be the one directly benefited or injured and therefore the lessee is not supposed to be the assured as he has no insurable interest.

On December 27, 2002, FEB filed its Notice of Appeal. Accordingly, on January 17, 2003, the court issued an Order elevating the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals. On March 15, 2005, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision declaring the transaction between the parties as a financial lease agreement. The said decision reversed and set aside the trial court’s decision dated November 22, 2002. Hence, Lim filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner has an insurable interest in the equipment and motor vehicles leased.

RULING:

Yes.

The stipulation in Section 14 of the leased contract, that the equipment shall be insured at the cost and expense of the lessee against loss, damage, or destruction from fire, theft, accident, or other insurable risk for the full term of the lease, is a binding and valid stipulation. Petitioner, as a lessee, has an insurable interest in the equipment and motor vehicles leased. Section 17 of the Insurance Code provides that the measure of an insurable interest in property is the extent to which the insured might be damnified by loss or injury thereof. It cannot be denied that JVL will be directly damnified in case of loss, damage, or destruction of any of the properties leased.